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Intellectual Property

U.S. FEDERALISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Jane C. Ginsburg*

INTR0DUCTION 1
The federal structure of the U.S. government presents interesting questions for
intellectual property. Which government, national or state, exercises regulatory
authority? Or do both governments play a significant role? Questions of this
order cannot be addressed unless one first analyzes what the term "intellectual
property" comprehends. Intellectual property includes well-recognized regimes
of exclusive rights in inventions (patents), literary, artistic and musical creations
(copyrights), and trademarks. But it also covers more elusive, and evolving,
interests, such as exploitation of one's personal name and image (right of
publicity), trade secrets, and a generalized concern with prevention of acts
amounting to unlicensed appropriation of another's time, labor, and money. To
which lawmakers and judges, state or federal, then, do claimants and users look
to determine the existence and scope of protection for this capacious subject
matter?
At first blush, one might assume that all these varieties of intellectual property
fall under exclusive federal ordering. By nature, inventions, works of authorship,
trade symbols, and such, resist confinement to local boundaries. When ideas and
images range widely, their subjection to discrete, and potentially conflicting,
territorial regimes can frustrate their effective dissemination, and can produce
commercial uncertainty and insecurity. In the U.S. federal system, however, the
national government is supposed to be of limited powers; it may not regulate an
area simply because uniform national regulation seems good policy. More
important than the legal dimensions of U.S. federalism are its political ones.
Federal intervention needs justification, and, largely for historical reasons,
significant areas are thought to reside with state governments. 2 In the U.S., the

* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University
School of Law. © 1997, Jane C. Ginsburg.
1 The Introduction and Part I are adapted in part from Federalisme et propriete intellectuelle, in
L'ETAT EN AMERIQUE 193-207 (Marie-France Toinet ed. 1988). Many thanks to Steven Shaber,
Columbia J.D. 1996, for research assistance with Parts II B and C.
2 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
The extent to which state interests are now represented in the national government is the subject of
considerable dispute, but the important point is that federal intervention needs to be specifically
justified.
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general areas of property law, tort law, and contract law - all fields relating
directly or indirectly to intellectual property - are traditionally considered the
subject of state regulation.
Nonetheless, the U.S. Constitution proves quite accommodating to federal
protection for many varieties of intellectual property. The document both
authorizes and anticipates creation of a federal patent and copyright system, for
it explicitly authorizes the national government "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. " 3 The little
available evidence of the Framers' intent in including this authority indicates
that they recognized the inefficacy of disparate state regulation of inventions and
works of authorship: in Federalist No. 43, James Madison observed, "The utility
of this power will scarcely be questioned . . . . The States cannot separately
make effectual provision for either ... [copyright or patent]." 4
Madison's point would seem equally applicable to other varieties of
intellectual property. Indeed, today, most commentators would acknowledge the
national government's authority to regulate all forms of intellectual property by
virtue of the constitutional grant to Congress of the power "to regulate
Commerce ... among the several States. " 5 But the existence of authority is one
thing, its exercise quite another. Here the historical dynamics of American
federalism are important. The vast domain of federal power has not been fully
occupied, and accordingly, outside the realm of patent and copyright, the states
do play a role in the regulation of intellectual property. Moreover, state-based
protections have occasionally penetrated even these core federal areas. There are
various reasons for continued state intervention in at least certain intellectual
property areas. Some stem from the states' established role in governing
property rights and relations in general. Another, which forms one focus of this
paper, derives from the U.S. tradition of looking to the states as "laboratories"
for the development of the law and social policy.6 According to this tradition,
state courts and legislatures experiment locally with evolving rights and modes
of regulation. Subsequently, the local experience may form the basis for
adoption of the same or similar laws by other states, and perhaps ultimately by
the national legislature.
This paper has two parts. Part I considers the regulation of intellectual
properties that come primarily within the federal domain. Part I first identifies
the respective federal and state jurisdictions over various kinds of rights, and
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
A. Hamilton, J. Jay, J. Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Madison), 278-79 (Modem Library
ed., n.d.).
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of the expansive reach of the Commerce Clause in
contemporary American legal doctrine, see, e.g., L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232-44
(2d ed. 1978).
6
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.").
3
4
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then examines some instances in which federal and state intellectual property
interests may come into conflict. Part II addresses three examples of state-based
intellectual property rights that were adopted into federal law.
I.

PRIMARILY FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER

Federal statutes regulate patents,7 copyrights, 8 and trademarks. 9 Indeed,
national legislation provides that only federal law may govern copyright subject
matter, 10 and that the federal courts alone may judge patent and copyright
claims. 11 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized exclusive
federal authority to grant patents. 12 By contrast, Congress has, in most instances,
left trademarks to concurrent state and federal ordering, 13 although the national
uniformity advantages of federal trademark registration and regulation are
sufficiently great that congressional enactments set forth the dominant law in
this realm. 14
State laws affect intellectual property in several ways. Some state laws create
exclusive rights in subject matter not covered by .federal statutes. Examples
include certain kinds of idea protection, and the exclusive right of performers
and other celebrities to commercialize their names and images (in the U.S., this
is called the right of publicity). 15 Other kinds of state laws touch federallyregulated subject matter, but they purport to respond to a range of activities
broader than or different from those proscribed by federal law. For example,
federal patent and copyright laws essentially forbid use or copying; state unfair
competition law may strike at a variety of unethical business practices, including
deception of the public, breach of a trust relationship, and conversion. In so
doing, however, the state law may also prohibit unauthorized uses and
reproductions.
35 u.s.c. §§ 1-376.
17 u.s.c. §§ 101-810.
9 15 u.s.c. §§ 1051-1127.
10 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a).
II 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
12 See, e.g., Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears Roebuck &
Co. v. Sliffe! Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964).
13 The Lanham Federal Trademark Act contains no provision generally abrogating State authority
to afford independent, parallel, trademark protection, but does prohibit state and local entities from
requiring alteration of a federally registered mark, 15 U.S.C. § l 12l(a). Similarly, the Lanham Act
also sets forth as one of its purposes "to protect registered marks used in such commerce [within the
control of Congress] from interference by State, or territorial legislation," 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See
generally Wetzel, Federal Preemption Under the Lanham Act, 76 TRADEMARK REPTR. 243 (1986). 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) provides for concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over federal trademark
claims.
14 Thus, for example, the recent RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
(1995), reflects the analyses of the federal courts in Lanham Act (federal trademarks act) cases at
least as much, if not more, than of state courts in state-law unfair competition claims.
is Of the 22 states which have now recognized a right of publicity, half do so by statute, while
the rest rely on common law construction. See generally J.T. McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PRIVACY
AND PullLICITY § 6.3 ( 1987).
7

8
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Occasionally, state and federal regulatory regimes may clash. That is, even
though a state may not have deliberately erected a competing regime for
regulating an area controlled by national law, application of state law in a given
situation may produce results inconsistent with federal policy. For example, if, in
order to prevent public confusion regarding the origin of the goods, a state
attempts to forbid copying an article that is itself an insufficient advance over
the prior art to merit a federal patent, the state intervention would accord an
exclusivity that federal law has declined to extend. 16 For American lawyers the
crucial question then becomes whether the federal level (or lack) of protection
sets the sole measure, or whether the federal law in effect establishes a
minimum standard of protection, leaving the states free ·to afford more than the
national legislature has chosen to accord. 17 If the former, the state law is invalid
- "preempted" in the American legal jargon. If the latter, there is no federal
preemption.
The foregoing example reveals an important feature of American federal-state
relations: determination of whether state law has been preempted by federal law
is not easy. Case law on this problem abounds in many areas, and the standard
formulas employed by the Supreme Court often obscure rather than illuminate.
The core idea is that of conflict, but the existence of a conflict is not selfevident. A judgment of this nature requires a precise assessment of the purposes
and effects of both the federal and the state laws. 18 In the intellectual property
field, the extensive scope of federal regulation often does point to the conclusion
that federal law should supply the sole measure of what interests are to be
protected.
Of course, one might always argue that the federal and state authorities are in
fact regulating different activities. The copying example discussed above is a
good illustration. One could maintain that federal law simply proscribes the act
of copying, while forbidding copying is merely an incidental side effect of the
state law prohibition, which proscribes acts that may confuse the public
concerning the origin of the goods in question. Nonetheless, the conflict between
the laws seems unmistakable. Federal law has pronounced that some objects can
be copied; state law has stepped in to prevent the reproductions. At this point
the purpose of the federal law becomes crucial. If one determines that the
absence of federal protection indicates the national legislator's policy that no
regime, state or federal, is to prohibit the copying of the object in question,
application of the state law would frustrate federal objectives. In that case, the
state law must yield to the national ·policy.
But there are many instances where state law protection is entirely compatible
with the federally prescribed regime. Suppose, for example, that one party
16

This is essentially the situation the Supreme Court confronted in the decisions cited supra, note

12.
17 Compare California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court held that federal laws prohibiting pregnancy discrimination in the workplace could be
supplemented by state laws more generous to the pregnant employee.
18
For a selection of cases and materials, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291-310 (12th ed.
1991).
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discloses information to another, with the understanding that the information was
revealed in confidence, and is not to be used unless the disclosing party
supervises and exclusively benefits from the other party's use. In these
circumstances the information would constitute a trade secret. Accordingly, were
the recipient of the information to disclose it to third party competitors, or use it
to set itself up as a competitor, most states would enjoin such violations of the
trade secret.1 9 Moreover, that action would not be deemed to violate federal
policy, even if the information concerned subject matter, such as a
manufacturing process, or industrial blueprints, coming within the scope of
federal law. 20
What features of a state intellectual property law, as well as of the national
regulatory scheme, justify persistence of the state law? When state and federal
laws touch on the same subject matter, it may not be enough that the state seeks
to protect interests arguably different from those promoted by federal policies.21
The key may lie in such considerations as the nature of the remedy sought, and
the breadth of the class of persons subject to that relief. A generally applicable
state law that, inter alia, effectively prohibits use or copying achieves the same
result as does a federal patent or copyright action: potential conflict is therefore
manifest. If a different, less drastic, form of relief can vindicate the state
objective, principles of federalism will probably limit application of the state law
to its more modest remedies. 22
With regard to the reach of the state remedy, if the party invoking the state
right seeks to assert it against all competitors, regardless of the presence or
absence of any prior course of dealing or relationship, plaintiff would be
attempting an unqualified exercise of exclusive rights. Such broad pretensions
come too close to the scope of intellectual property protection regulated by
federal law. If, on the other hand, as in the trade secrets example, only those
who enter into or disrupt some prior contractual relationship with the plaintiff
are subject to the state law, 23 then outsiders would not be bound by plaintiff's
l9 See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (TIIlRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995); Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, 14 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 437-67 (1990), 112 (Supp. 1995). The Act has
been adopted in 39 states and the District of Columbia.
20 This fact pattern and result describe the U.S. Supreme Court's key trade secret-patent
preemption case, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). In the wake of that
decision, state courts continue to uphold trade secret claims against patent preemption challenges.
See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1417 (Wash. 1987).
21 But, if the state interests are not qualitatively different from those at stake in the federal action,
the state claim will almost certainly be held preempted. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983) (state claims at issue did not assert rights different
in kind from rights protected under federal copyright law), rev' d on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 2218
(1985); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985) (same); Baltimore Orioles v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n., CCH Copyr. L. Dec. para. 26,024 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
22 In the same decision in which it held preempted a state law prohibiting the copying of
utilitarian designs, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that "a State may, in appropriate
circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or other precautionary
steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source." Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
23 It is helpful to remember here that state law normally governs employment, fiduciary, and
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assertions: they are free independently to generate and then to use the same
material. In this instance, the more limited reach of the state-created remedy
renders the state law more likely to coexist harmoniously with the federal
scheme. 24
The possible resilience of state-law protection of information in the face of
preemption under the copyright statute and Patent-Copyright Clause should not
obscure a different kind of federalism problem. To this point, the discussion has
concerned "vertical" federalism issues, that is, whether state regulation in the
intellectual property field conflicts with federal regulation of the same field.
State protection of information poses both dormant commerce clause and
"horizontal," or sister-state, federalism issues as well. As the Supreme Court
has observed, one must inquire whether "in actual operation, the exercise of the
power to grant copyrights by some States will prejudice the interests of other
States. " 25 In that particular case, the Court determined that no sister-state
conflict was presented because "a copyright granted by a particular State has
effect only within its boundaries. " 26 Whatever the accuracy of this assumption in
1973 when the case was decided, and of its twin concept of state regulation of
subject matter of "purely local importance, " 27 it seems most implausible today,
particularly in the domain of digital communications. As a practical matter, if
not all fifty states will protect information, or will not protect it in the same
ways, one state's regulation may both disrupt the national dissemination of
information as well as interfere with another state's information protection
policies.
For example, suppose that Ohio, by common law or by statute, protects
databases against the extraction of information for commercial purposes,
including creation of derivative compilations that do not directly compete with
their source. Suppose further that New York, preferring free access to and
competition in information, affords no such protection; and that California law
affords a remedy only against substantial verbatim copying to create a directly
competing compilation. Now assume that a California database producer brings a
claim in Ohio against a New York defendant who accessed plaintiff's work in
New York and there compiled a directory drawn entirely from information
contained in plaintiff's database. Defendant's directory is differently organized
and is aimed at a different clientele than plaintiff's. Defendant has sold copies of
its directory in Ohio. 28 What kinds of horizontal federalism problems does the
contractual relationships.
24
See e.g., Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A copyright is a right
against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they
please, so contracts do not create "exclusive rights.")
25 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973).
26 Id.
v Id.
28
This example is inspired by the facts of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th
Cir. 1988), in which a California software producer sold programs packaged with a "shrinkwrap
license" that purported to prohibit purchasers from copying or decompiling the program. Defendant,
a Canadian corporation, acquired plaintiff's software in Canada, and there decompiled it to generate
a competing program. Some copies of defendant's program were sold in Louisiana. Plaintiff sued in
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Ohio suit pose?
If Ohio declines to apply its own law to this controversy, sister-state
sovereignty will be respected. However, the forum may well apply its own law,
either by "homing instinct" reflex, or after some kind of conflicts inquiry. 29
Application of Ohio's protective law would clash both with New York's freecopying policy and with California's limited scope of protection. The Ohio court
might nonetheless attempt to avoid offense to these states (and to other states
whose policies differ from Ohio's) by restricting the remedy to Ohio acts. Thus,
any injunction would apply only to Ohio distribution of the directory, and
damages would be awarded only for copies sold in Ohio.
But even this limited application of Ohio law may as a practical matter have
extraterritorial implications compromising both sister state sovereignty and
national commerce. Defendant's directory travels in interstate commerce: keeping
it out of Ohio may be no easy task. The problem becomes even more acute if
defendant's directory is not a hardcopy document, but is itself a database,
furnished to users through interstate transmission of data over a digital network.
Ohio cannot erect boundaries impermeable to such communications. An Ohio
injunction therefore becomes problematic. The injunction poses the potential for
broad interstate effect: keeping digital transmissions (or phone, radio or satellite
signals) out of Ohio entails denial of access to all within the communication's
reach. The extrusive character of the remedy in tum puts pressure on a court
either to decline to recognize the Ohio law claim,30 or to hold the Ohio law
federally preempted under the Commerce Clause, 31 or to hold it an
Louisiana, alleging a violation of Louisiana's shrinkwrap license statute. The Court held the statute
preempted by the federal Copyright Act.
29 In this case, the pre-interest analysis lex loci delicti rule would support application of Ohio law,
since copies were sold in Ohio. Interest analysis might also lead to application of forum law, if only
because interest analysis often indicates lex Jori. See, e.g., Euol!NE SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICTS
OF LAWS 16-27 (1984); Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34
MERCER L. REv. 521, 587-88 (1983). In Vault, supra note 28, the district court, after performing a
perfunctory choice of law inquiry, applied Louisiana law (and later held it federally preempted),
despite the slim, at best, contacts between the state, the parties, and the bulk of sales. See 655
F.Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987).
30 Cf RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1940). In this case, Judge Learned
Hand declined to recognize asserted equitable servitude arising out of "not for broadcast" labels on
sound recordings. He acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Waring v. WDAS,
37 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (l 937), had reached a contrary decision, and that broadcast of the records
into Pennsylvania would thus be a tort in that state; but declined to enter an injunction for the sole
benefit of Pennsylvania, when all surrounding territories would not uphold the servitude: "Even if it
be mechanically possible to prevent any broadcasting through the angle which the state of
Pennsylvania subtends at the transmission station, that would shut out points both in front of, and
beyond, Pennsylvania. We must therefore choose between denying any injunction whatever - since
in our judgment the act is unlawful only in Pennsylvania - or enjoining [defendant] from
broadcasting throughout the Union and in Canada in order to prevent a tort in Pennsylvania alone.''
3, Cf Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (holding that the Commerce Clausederived FCC Act preempted the state of Oklahoma's prohibition on certain kinds of television
advertising; since the broadcast signals came from out-of-state, Oklahoma's law necessarily affected
all states receiving the broadcast signal). To the extent that state regulation impacts on information
communicated by cable or satellite, the state law may be preempted under the Federal
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impermissible encroachment on sister-state interests.32
This summary presentation of federal intellectual property preemption
endeavored to show that while federal law occupies much of the field, some
room remains for state law. How much room may prove an elusive
determination, for the boundaries between state and federal subject matter,
rights, and remedies often lack clear demarcation. Nonetheless, where the border
is vague, and especially where the state law seems to encroach significantly on
the federal preserve (or on sister-state prerogatives), the federal law most often
will provide the measure of protection. The second part of this paper will
consider three instances of federal adoption of state intellectual property
measures. It is important to note, however, that in all three cases, the federal law
supplements, but does not completely displace, state law rights.
II.

FEDERAL ADOPTION OF STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS

This review of federal absorption of state intellectual property norms
addresses rights once outside the scope of federal enactments. Two of the
examples come from the copyright domain, the other concerns trademark law.
All three cases involve recent federal legislation, from 1990, 1994 and 1996.
A.

Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990

The first example concerns the non-economic, "moral" rights of visual artists.
The Visual Artists' Rights Act (VARA) of 1990 represents the federal copyright
act's first explicit - albeit limited - incorporation of the author's personal
rights to attribution of authorship, and to preserve the integrity of her work.
Several states, most notably New York and California, had previously enacted
statutes protecting the attribution and integrity rights of artists. 33 VARA may
afford a partial response to those who criticized the U.S. failure, upon joining
the Berne Convention, to enact specific moral rights protection. 34 At the time,
the U.S. asserted that a combination of federal and state law protections together
afforded protection equivalent to that required under Berne Convention minimum
standards.35
Communications Act.
32 Cf Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546.
33 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 987(a); New York Arts & Cultural Affairs Law § 14.03.
34 See, e.g., Adolf Dietz, Les Etats-Unis et le Droit Moral: ldiosyncrasie ou Rapprochement, 142
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 223 (Oct. 1989).
35 Congress relied on a study conducted by a State Department-convened Ad Hoc Working Group
on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, which concluded respecting moral rights:
Given the substantial protection now available for the real equivalent of moral rights under
statutory and common law in the United States, the lack of uniformity in protection of other
Berne nations, the absence of moral rights provisions in some of their copyright laws and the
preservation of control over remedies to each Berne country, the protection of moral rights in
the United States is compatible with the Berne Convention.
Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 Cot.UM.
J. L. & THE ARTS 513, 547 (1986). The reference to the absence of moral rights provisions in the
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To appreciate the relationship of VARA to state law artists' rights measures,
we will first outline VARA's coverage, and then compare it with that afforded
under the New York statute. VARA's protected subject matter is defined rather
restrictively:
a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or,
in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved or fabricated sculptures of 200 or
fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other
identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. 36

The definition also explicitly excludes "any work made for hire." The
parsimoniousness of the definition denotes an attempt to achieve at least two
objectives: 1) to reassure large exploiters, such as publishers of periodicals, that
they need not fear moral rights claims from artists creating works for their
publications; 37 2) to limit the law's coverage to objects of "Art," rather than of
mass production. 38 Moreover, even if the artistic creation meets the Act's
definition, it is important to understand that the Act secures rights only with
respect to the two-hundred (or fewer) physical copies; the Act does not protect
the "work" in the incorporeal copyright sense. In other words, the Act protects
particular copies, not any "image" independently of those limited number of
copies.
This distinction between copy and image carries several consequences. Most
obviously, it does not forbid destruction or mutilation of any copy falling
outside the definition. Most importantly, artists are afforded no general right
against misrepresentation or distortion of images, even by means of large scale
or gross alterations of reproductions of the works. In essence, the Act would
protect Leonardo's original canvas of the Mona Lisa against Duchamp's
moustache (had any copyright in Leonardo's work not expired, and had
domestic laws of some Berne adherents appears to target, inter alia, Australia, and (at the time), the

U.K.
36 17 U.S.C. § 101. The requirement that the works be signed and, where applicable,
consecutively numbered may constitute a "formality" incompatible with article 5.2 of the Berne
Convention. But see H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d sess. at 12 (1990) (distinguishing
numbering and marking requirement from notice of copyright).
31 Cf 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (no termination right in works made for hire).
38 The provision of the Visual Artists Rights Act entitling the author to prevent the destruction of
a .. work of recognized stature" (17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B)) supplies further indication of
Congress's intention to avoid conferring moral rights on unworthy works. However, resort to a merit
criterion cuts against a long copyright tradition eschewing value or aesthetic judgments about works
of authorship. As Justice Holmes cautioned in a 1903 Supreme Court decision, judges make poor art
critics, and should not be pressed into that service: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only in the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations ...
. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke . . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less
educated than the judge." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
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Duchamp drawn or displayed the moustache directly on the canvas after the
Act's effective date); but the Act would not prevent Duchamp from making his
own copy of the Mona Lisa and drawing a moustache on that copy. Thus, an art
book publisher who prints a substantially discolored version of a painting, or a
poster manufacturer who enlarges and reproduces a small portion of the work, 39
or a magazine publisher who prints only half a photograph, would incur no
liability under the Act. Nor does the Act reach the problem of exploitations of
artworks that the creator finds demeaning, for example, laminating reproductions
(beyond the key two hundred) of a painting onto ashtrays. 40
By contrast, the New York statute protects not only the physical original (or
limited edition copy) of a painting or sculpture, it also extends the integrity right
to reproductions of those works. Thus, distortion of an image of a painting will
violate New York law if the distorted version is presented as the artist's work. 41
Because the state law protects against activities the federal law tolerates, is
there a tension between VARA and the New York statute? In other words, does
VARA preempt the more protective New York law? VARA contains a provision
preempting "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the rights
conferred by [VARA] with respect to works of visual art to which the rights
conferred by [VARA] apply." 42 Thus, while VARA cancels duplicative state
claims, it does not preempt state moral rights protection of subject matter not
covered by VARA. 43 As a result, federal law has incorporated and displaced
39 Cf. Wojnarovicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F.Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (third party
defendant created and distributed photographs of fragments of plaintiff artist's collage) discussed
infra.
40 Moreover, even with respect to works covered by the law, the Visual Artist's Rights Act
exempts "[t]he modification of a work of visual art which is the result of conservation, or of the
public presentation, including lighting and placement ... unless the modification is caused by gross
negligence." sec. 603(c)(2), 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2).
The limited definition of protected artworks has another unfortunate consequence. The law not
only disqualifies integrity claims of salaried authors and of creators of large editions, but also fails to
afford these authors an attribution claim. Whatever the merits of limiting the class of artists who
may benefit from the integrity right, the arguments in favor of that limitation do not readily extend
to the attribution right. The artist's interest in receiving credit for her creation, and the public's
interest in knowing the creator's identity, do not diminish as the size of the edition increases. By the
same token, where attribution is concerned, it should not matter whether the work is displayed in an
art gallery, or on the pages of a magazine. Nor is a work-for-hire exception appropriate. The work
for hire doctrine allocates ownership of the economic rights, but, despite deeming the employer the
statutory "author," the doctrine is not a labeling law; it does not purport to recast a mere payor as a
true creator. Recognizing employees'-for-hire attribution rights does not modify the employer's rights
of economic exploitation; rights in the work remain as alienable as before. It simply requires
addition of a credit line somewhere on the work of visual art.
" See, e.g., Wojnarowicz, supra note 39.
42 17 u.s.c. § 301(f)(l).
43 VARA also explicitly preserves state claims arising before VARA's effective date, 17 U.S.C.
§ 3012(f)(2); Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas Assoc., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1622 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Similarly, VARA preserves state moral rights claims, even if equivalent to VARA claims, if these
claims address violations that occurred after the artist's death. 17 U.S.C. § 30l(f)(2). VARA includes
the latter exception to preemption because the duration of VARA rights is only for the life of the
artist. See 11 U.S.C. §106A(d).
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state moral rights law with respect to the integrity and attribution of the physical
object, but state law moral rights coverage of the artistic image remains
available.
Ironically, federal law sets aside state law in the area to which state law most
aptly applies: territorially discrete acts. For example, the subject matter of the
federal law includes large, essentially immobile art works, such as monumental
sculpture and frescos. Works of this kind are not reproduced in copies for
interstate dissemination, and their bulk makes unlikely the probability that they
will elude the reach of state law because the originals have been transported
across the border. Nor does this subject matter lend itself to the kind of
geographically pervasive illicit activity that usually characterizes violations of
incorporeal intellectual property.
Granted, there may be gains from the uniformity VARA offers, as well as
from ensuring protection in those states that had neither statutory nor common
law guarantees of artists' rights. But the other compelling reason for federalizing
intellectual property regulation - the (in theory) limited territorial reach of state
law - seems weakened, if not absent, when the law targets physical rather than
incorporeal property.
By contrast, federal law does not reach that aspect of state moral rights
protection that does pose territoriality problems: the application of the right of
integrity to the reproduction of an artwork. Images, as opposed to originals, do
pervasively traverse state boundaries, thus presenting the kinds of horizontal
federalism problems discussed earlier. For example, the leading decision
interpreting the New York artists' rights statute concerned the dissemination of
reproductions that separated and enlarged certain portions of plaintiff's collagelike works. The defendant was a resident of Mississippi, where it produced the
distorted reproduction as part of a campaign denouncing public funding of the
arts. A few of defendant's brochures were sent to New York: this sufficed to
permit the court not only to assert personal jurisdiction in New York, but to
apply New York law to defendant's largely out-of-state activities, and ultimately
to "require defendants to distribute a corrective communication to all those to
whom they sent the original pamphlet". 44 The court did not limit its injunction
to New York recipients of the original pamphlet.
B.

Performers' Rights in Unfixed Musical Performances

Since 1978, the federal copyright law has protected all "works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression ... " 45 These include sound recordings,
such as authorized fixations of a musical performance on a tape or CD. The
1976 Copyright Act also protected live transmissions of performances, if the
transmission was being simultaneously recorded (fixed). 46 Missing from the
scope of federal protection were live performances, including transmissions not

44
45

46

Wojnarovicz, supra note 39.
17 U.S.C. § I02(a).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "fixed").

474

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW

[Vol. 2

undergoing simultaneous fixation. For example, a live performance in a concert
or dance hall, or a radio broadcast not simultaneously recorded by the
broadcaster, did not come within the subject matter of federal law. 47
Many states, however, had developed protections for unfixed performances,
through common law copyright, unfair competition, 48 or right of publicity 49
doctrines, or by specific legislation. 50 But the problems endemic to state
intellectual property regimes prevailed: territoriality and disuniformity of
protection. In addition, states afforded no protection against an important source
of bootlegged recordings, foreign imports. For one thing, if the unauthorized
fixation took place abroad, no violation of the state law would have occurred.51
Moreover, only the U.S. Customs Service had authority to block entry of foreign
recordings of unauthorized fixations, but no federal law empowered the Customs
Service to act. 52
Thus, effective protection required the intervention of federal law. The need
for a federal regime became particularly apparent as a result of the elaboration
of the TRIPs (trade-related aspects of intellectual property) agreement during the
Uruguay Round of the GAIT negotiations. Article 14.1 of the TRIPs agreement
requires:
In respect of a fixation of their performance on a phonogram, performers shall have
the possibility of preventing the following acts when undertaken without their
authorization: the fixation of their unfixed performance and the reproduction of such
fixation. Performers shall also have the possibility of preventing the following acts
when undertaken without their authorization: the broadcasting by wireless means and
the communication to the public of their live performance.

Thus, as part of the Uruguay Round Amendments Act, Congress added a new
Chapter 11 to the federal copyright act. 53 The federal fixation right adopts the
47 The plot of the French film Diva (Jean-Jacques Beneix 1982) follows the fate of an
unauthoriud audiocassette of the live performance of an opera singer who refuses to make sound
recordings of her performances. The protagonist made the cassette by sneaking a high-quality tape
recorder into the concert hall. This kind of activity would not have violated federal law before the
1994 amendments.
48 See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Association v. Wagner-Nichols Recording Co., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483
(Sup. Ct. 1950) (unauthorized recording made from radio broadcast of Metropolitan Opera
performance).
49 See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977). Cf.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 443 U.S. 562 (1977) (unauthorized television
broadcast of performance of "human cannonball").
'° See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(l). See generally Wn.LIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT AND TifE
GAIT: AN INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TifE URUGUAY ROUND AMENDMENTS ACT 9
(1995) (describing state protections against recording live performances).
s, See PATRY, supra at 9 & n.28.
S2 Id.
53 Although Congress placed this chapter in Title 17, the authority for the legislation may emanate
as much from the Commerce Clause as from the Patent-Copyright Clause of the Constitution. See
PATRY, supra note 50, at 10-11, 18. There are two grounds for challenging the characterization of
chapter 11 as a copyright law. First, it protects unfixed performances, while the constitutional
Copyright Clause empowers Congress to secure exclusive rights in the "writings" of authors; the
term "writings" may imply fixed works. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)
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TRIPs requirements, 54 with a further specification extending copyright

infringement remedies against anyone who: "distributes . . . any copy or
phonorecord [of the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance]
fixed [without authorization], regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the
United States. " 55
This provision deserves emphasis. While the doctrine of territoriality
circumscribed state law protection for live performances, federal law has
explicitly overridden territorial limitations. Under chapter 11, the act of U.S.
distribution makes out the violation. Thus, for example, even if the unauthorized
recerding of a live performance was not unlawful in the country in which the
fixation was made, distributing that recording in the U.S. would be illicit.
What of the relationship of the new federal law to state laws affording similar
rights? Chapter 11 explicitly preserves state statutory and common law
remedies. 56 In this case, unlike state moral rights laws, however, federal
coverage of fixation rights in musical performances is so much more complete
that the persistence of state remedies is likely to have little practical import. On
the other hand, state remedies remain the only recourse with respect to fixation
of non-musical performances, for example, theatrical improvisations and
spectacles.
C.

Trademarks: Federal Anti-Dilution Protection

Trademark law primarily protects the trademark owner against unauthorized
uses of the mark that are likely to mislead or confuse the public into believing
that the trademark owner was the source of, or authorized the user's goods or
services.57 In U.S. trademarks law, the owner's rights in a mark are not "in
gross," as they are for copyrights and patents; rather than affording a claim
against copying per se, a trademark claim fails if the unauthorized use of the
mark does not create "confusion as to source." Early trademarks case law
tended to equate source confusion with direct or close competition. For example,
unauthorized use of KODAK for cameras or photographic equipment, or even
photograph albums, would have fit within the traditional purview of protection,
but using KODAK as a brand name for bicycles would not. 58 Nonetheless, even
if consumers would not have believed that the Eastman Kodak Company
manufactured the bicycles, or licensed its name to the bicycle manufacturer, the
(the constitutional term "writings" "include[s] all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &
c., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression"). Second, chapter 11
sets forth no duration of the fixation right This might mean that the usual copyright term applies, or,
according to PATRY, supra note SO, at 18, that the fixation right is "perpetual." Because the
constitutional Copyright Clause restricts Congress's power to secure exclusive rights to "limited
times," that clause does not authorize the granting of perpetual rights.
s4 See 17 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l)(2).
ss 17 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(3).
56 17 U.S.C. § llOl(d).
s1 See Lanham Federal Trademarks Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.] §§ 32, 43(a).
ss See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 Rep. Pat. Cas. 105 (1898), discussed in Frank
I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 821-26 (1927).
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bicycle purveyor would have been trading off the goodwill of the famous mark.
Moreover, were the practice of unauthorized adoption of famous marks for
unrelated goods to proliferate, famous marks might ultimately lose their
distinctiveness as trademarks.
Although the leading U.S. article proposing protection against the usurpation
of a trademark's goodwill, even in the absence of competition or consumer
confusion, appeared in 1927,59 states did not begin to enact statutes prohibiting
the "dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark" until twenty years later. 60
In 1964, the Model State Trademark bill incorporated a dilution section; 61 on the
eve of enactment of the federal anti-dilution act, twenty-seven states had enacted
anti-dilution statutes, most of them derived from the Model Bill.62 The Model
Bill provides:
INJURY TO BUSINESS REPUTATION; Dll..UTION
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality
of a mark ... shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of
confusion as to the source of goods or services.63

As elaborated by state courts, dilution took on two forms: "blurring" of the
mark's distinctive quality through unlicensed remote uses; and "tamishment" of
the mark's (or owner's) goodwill through unauthorized uses in unsavory
contexts.64 The two strands often overlapped, however: a mark "tarnished" by
association with some inappropriate goods or services is also threatened with
losing its distinctiveness because of the remote use. For example, use of the
well-known slogan for the American Express Card, "DON'T LEAVE HOME
WITHOUT IT," in an AIDS-era advertising campaign for condoms, not only
involves goods remote from credit card services, but also puts a, presumably
unwanted, sexual cast on those services.65
Although several of the twenty-seven states with anti-dilution statutes had
generated a considerable case law, 66 dilution doctrine suffered from the usual
Schechter, supra note 58.
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, Comment b. History.
61
See Andrew L. Goldstein, Bringing the Model State Trademark Bill Into the 90s and Beyond,
83 TRADEMARK REP. 226 (1993).
62
See, e.g., Eliott B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Reconciliation with the Lanham
Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 105 (1995); Trademarks Legislation: Hearing on
H.R. 1270 and H.R. 1295 before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 19, 1995) (Statement of Jonathan Moskin).
63
Model State Trademark Bill, § 12.
64
See generally Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First
Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REv. 1079 (1986) (reviewing evolution of anti-dilution doctrine).
65
See American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 2006
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). Tarnishment cases often involve sex and/or drugs. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987) (rejecting dilution/
tamishment claim against magazine parody recasting plaintiff's mail order clothing catalogue as
"L.L. Beam's Back-to-School Sex Catalogue"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo USA, Inc., 719 F.Supp.
795 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (upholding dilution/tamishment claim against producer of bubblegum resembling
cocaine powder sold in bottle emulating Coca-Cola trade dress).
66
The New York, Illinois, and Georgia statutes, for example, have spawned a sizable body of
judicial interpretation.
59

60
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failings of state intellectual property protection in a federal system: disuniformity
and territoriality. Indeed, for more than ten years preceding the new federal
statute, commentators had called for uniform federal regulation. 67 In 1987 the
United States Trademark Association (now the International Trademark
Association, INTA) proposed a federal anti-dilution amendment as part of the
1988 trademark law revision, but the amendment was ultimately withdrawn.
A similar text passed, however, in January 1996, with the support of many
trademark owners. Those who testified in favor of federalizing dilution
emphasized the need for uniformity, and for nationwide injunctions. 68 As with
the new federal right of fixation of live musical performances, the TRIPs accord
may have supplied further impetus for legislative action. Article 16;3 of that
agreement mandates a kind of dilution protection, more limited than that
available in some states, but, of course, more extensive than that available in the
twenty-three states that had no anti-dilution measures. 69
The "Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996," 70 entitles the owner of a
"famous mark" to enjoin
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution to the distinctive
quality of the mark .. ,71
The Act defines dilution as
the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 72
The Act also explicitly excludes from the scope of the dilution remedy
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial

advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of
the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 73
Congress intended the exclusions to ensure that the dilution remedy would not
target protected "speech," but would be limited to a third party's unauthorized
61 See, e.g., Beverly Pattishal, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark
Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289 (1984).
68
See, e.g., Statement of Mary Ann Alford, Executive Vice President, International Trademark
Association, Hearings, supra note 62, 1995 WL 435750.
69 Article 16.3 of TRIPs provides:
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services
which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered, provided that the
use of the trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection between
those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the
interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.
70 P.L. 104-98, Jan. 16, 1996, 109 Stat. 985.
1 1 Lanham Act § 43(c)(l), 15 U.S.C. § l 125(c)(l).
12 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
13 Lanham Act § 43(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).
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use of a famous mark to identify its own goods or services.74 Arguably, these
exclusions are superfluous: properly understood, the dilution doctrine only
concerns unauthorized adoption of a famous mark as another's identifying
symbol. 75
The new federal law appears to leave state anti-dilution law undisturbed, with
one explicit exception. It provides that ownership of a federal trademark
registration
shall be a complete bar to an action against that person under the common law or
statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark,
label, or form of advertisement. 76
If no state anti-dilution claim can be brought against a federally registered mark,
the clear implication is that state anti-dilution claims may still be enforced
against unregistered marks. Similarly, the legislative history indicates that while
the Lanham Act now protects nationally famous marks against dilution, federal
law "would not pre-empt existing state dilution statutes. State laws could
continue to be applied in cases involving locally famous or distinctive marks. " 77
The preservation of state dilution claims may be problematic; it threatens to
revive the "unpredictable" "patch-quilt" features of protection that lawmakers
and trademark owners decried before enactment of the federal provision. 78
Arguably, state protection will not interfere with nationwide rights, because one
can expect that any nationally famous mark would be registered. Any
unpredictability inherent in disuniform state regulation would, in theory, be
confined to the regulation of local trade symbols. Moreover, the preemption of
state dilution claims against federally registered marks may promote federal
registration for all marks, especially, perhaps, for less known marks that might
form the targets of state claims. Promoting federal registration enhances national
uniformity and predictability in trademark law.
Finally, the federal law expression of the dilution claim adopts the "blurring"
branch of dilution, but omits explicit reference to the "tarnishment" branch. The
federal text, for example, unlike the state Model Bill, does not mention "injury
to business reputation." Does this mean that there is no federal claim against
tamishment? And if not, do state tamishment claims survive? It would be
tempting to argue that the absence of an explicit tamishment claim reveals
Congress's intention to cut off that branch of the dilution doctrine. After all,
tamishment claims can conflict with speech interests, even if the threatened
speech is often "commercial," and hence less protected. 79 Nonetheless, the
legislative history suggests that Congress understood the concept of loss of
14

See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
See REsTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 and Comment a ("The
rules stated in Subsection (!) apply only when an actor uses the other's mark as a means of
identification for the actor's own goods, services, or business.").
76 Lanham Act § 43(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
77
H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, supra note 74. Accord, Statement of INTA, supra note 68.
78 See H.R. Rep. supra note 74.
79
See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1706 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
15
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distinctiveness to encompass disparagement and tamishment. 80 As a result, it
would seem that, to the extent that federal dilution law can incorporate
tarni~hment, without running afoul of the first amendment, so, too, can state
claims. By contrast, to the extent that state antidilution doctrine has not
incorporated the kinds of exclusions of noncommercial speech and comparative
advertising set forth in the federal statute, 81 the state laws may be vulnerable to
first amendment challenge. In that case, however, the new federal anti-dilution
statute would not preempt the state law; rather, the state law would be set aside
on constitutional grounds. Nonetheless, a comparison of the state law with the
new federal law would reinforce the constitutional challenge to the state law.
CONCLUSION
State regulation in territorially discrete (in theory) "laboratories," 82 can offer
useful lessons to later federal drafters. The three recent federal enactments
examined here all build on prior state legislation or common law. But the federal
measures respond only partially to the federalism concerns that state intellectual
property regulation poses. Because the federal laws leave much of the prior state
laws in place, the federal laws do not assure uniformity of national regulation.
Thus, while the federal measures in some respects improve the law evolved by
the states, Congress appears to accept a substantial continued risk of
unpredictable resolution of conflicting rights. This risk, viewed from within the
U.S. federal system, may be within our tolerance, as well as within our past
experience. Seen from without the U.S., and particularly from the burgeoning
system of international digital communications, the complexity of U.S.
regulation of intellectual property may well appear befuddling and frustrating.

so See H.R. Rep., supra note 74; Hearings, supra note 62; Staffin, supra note 62, at 152.
81 Lanham Act § 43(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4), discussed supra.
82 See discussion, supra, INTRODUCTION.

